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VOLUME 1965 SPRING NuMBER 2 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVIEW, AND THE 
TALISMAN OF STATE ACTION 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE* 
They also serve who only stand and wait.t 
I 
JN RECENT YEARS the Supreme Court has been greatly agi-
tated over the significance of a single word. That word is state. 
It appears just once in those compact clauses which provide: 
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1 
In those cases whi~h ordinarily occasion an examination of the 
word, it may initially be supposed that a person may have been de-
prived of due process or denied equal protection. Before embarking 
upon the usual sorting, weighing and balancing of interests under 
the appropriate rubric of due process or equal protection, however, 
the Court has frequently found it necessary first to determine 
whether there is any occasion for such an elaborate and arduous 
undertaking. If it is clear that the alleged deprivation of due pro-
cess or the claimed denial of equal protection cannot fairly be im-
puted to a state, for instance, there would seem to be no point what-
ever in pursuing the matter any further. After all, even the least 
sophisticated student appreciates the fact that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not grant or establish anything as a legal right; it merely 
provides a limited immunity against state divestiture of certain pre-
• A.B. 1955, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University. 
Professor of Law, Duke University. Senior Fellow, Yale Law School, 1964·65. 
t Milton, Sonnet on His Blindness. 
~ U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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rogatives which all persons may claim as human beings.2 Private 
interferences with those prerogatives, like acts of God, presumably 
raise no problems under the fourteenth amendment. If a man is on 
his way to address a meeting in a public park, for instance, the four-
teenth amendment apparently is no more involved when he is 
stopped by a private citizen who keeps him from the meeting than it 
would have been had he been detained by a sudden rainstorm. Since 
it would be futile for the Court to weigh the social value of rain-
storms against the value of a person's freedom of speech in order to 
determine whether there has been an abstract unconstitutional 
abridgment, it has ordinarily seemed equally foolish to undertake a 
weighing of interests in cases where private action alone has inter-
vened to frustrate a person's protected prerogatives. Thus, the initial 
issue in cases arising under the fourteenth amendment traditionally 
has been whether there was some reviewable state involvement in the 
acts of those who allegedly abridged the constitutionally protected 
interest in question. 
A classical treatment of this traditional approach is Black v. 
Cutter Labs.8 In that case, a private employee was discharged by 
a private employer because of her membership in the Communist 
Party. The discharge was pursuant to a private collective bar-
gaining contract which provided that such membership would 
constitute "just cause" for discharge. The discharge was upheld 
by the California Supreme Court. The employee's petition for 
certiorari was dismissed by a majority of the Supreme Court on 
the ground that "the decision involves only California's construction 
of a local contract under local law and therefore no substantial fed-
eral question is presented."4 The Court did not decide on the 
2 See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 326 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Bouie v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 365 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Griffin v. Maryland, 
378 U.S. 130, 138 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 
151-52 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 
715, 722 (1961) (dictum); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 658 (1951) (dictum); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (dictum); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 
330 (1926); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920) (dictum); Hodges v. 
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (dictum); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) 
(dictum); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638-40 (1882): Virginia v. Rives, 100 
U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (dictum); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554·55 (1875) 
(dictum) • 
• 351 u.s. 292 (1956). 
'!d. at 299. (Emphasis added.) 
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merits that the particular employer's business interests as weighed 
against the employee's circumstances and interests made the em-
ployer's decision constitutional because it was reasonable. So far 
as the majority was concerned, the reasonableness of the employer's 
decision was not reviewable because of the fact that no state in-
volvement beyond orderly protection of that decision was present; 
absent some other state action, there was nothing to review. The 
employer, not the State of California, had fired the employee, 
and if due process had been denied, it had been denied by the em-
ployer and not by California. 
A recent and exceptionally vigorous restatement of this common 
sense approach is provided by Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion 
in Bell v. Maryland.G There, twelve Negro students had been con-
victed of trespass after refusing to leave a restaurant when requested 
to do so by the manager, who was acting on orders given by one 
Hooper, the president of the corporation which owned the restau-
rant. Whether Hooper's decision to refuse service and exclude the 
Negroes was reasonable under all the circumstances, i.e.) whether the 
corporation's interest in freedom of action, its business risks,· its 
employees' associational preferences, etc., were of sufficient impor-
tance to rationalize whatever injury was done to the interests of the 
Negroes by their being denied service, was never discussed by Mr. 
Justice Black. It would supposedly have been a waste of time for 
him to make such an inquiry if the exclusionary decision could not 
have been reasonably imputed to the state. Absent some significant 
involvement of the state, this "private" denial of equal protection 
would no more have raised a constitutional issue under the four-
teenth amendment than had lightning arbitrarily struck the Negroes 
just before they entered the restaurant. 
Accordingly, in keeping with sensible orthodoxy and the logical 
order for reviewing the issues, Mr. Justice Black began his opinion 
by noting that the equal protection clause could be brought into 
play only after a determination that the state, in this case Maryland, 
had made the decision to exclude the Negroes: 
• 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964). For the fate of the majority's treatment of the case, see 
Bell v. State, 204 A.2d 54 (Md. 1964). The Court will not be confronted with the 
case again, however, because of its decision in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 
306 (1964). 
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This section of the Amendment, unlike other sections,a is a pro· 
hibition against certain conduct only when done by a State-'state 
action' as it has come to be known-and 'erects no shield against 
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.'7 
He then pointed out that the facts clearly established that Maryland 
did not attempt to influence the owner's decision to refuse service 
to Negroes: 
There is no Maryland law, no municipal ordinance, and no official 
proclamation or action of any kind that shows the slightest state 
coercion of, or encouragement to, Hooper to bar Negroes from his 
restaurant.s 
Mr. Justice Black might also have added that there was no govern-
mental subsidy, leasehold connection or delegation of governmental 
functions which could identify Maryland as the necessary "real" 
• At this point, Mr. Justice Black inserted the following footnote: "E.g., § 5 (of the 
fourteenth amendment]: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.'" I d. at 326. In several other places in his 
opinion, Mr. Justice Black further adverted to the power of Congress to extend the 
coverage of equal protection to private acts of discrimination. See, e.g., id. at 329, 
335, 339, 343. Is Mr. Justice Black ·prepared to uphold federal legislation bottomed 
on § 5 of the fourteenth amendment and directed against discrimination in all places 
of public accommodation, not merely against those affecting interstate commerce or 
involving orthodox state action? While he has expressly declined to commit himself, 
id. at 343, I believe that he is. 
Support for such an exercise of congressional authority can be found in FAIRMAN, 
MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME CoURT 1862-1890 190-93 (1939); HARRIS, THE 
QUEST FOR EQUAUTY (1960); MAGRATII, MORRISON·R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARAC· 
TER 116·34 (1963); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection 
of the Laws," 50 CoLuM. L. REv. 131 (1950); Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Hale, 
Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by 
Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GUILD REv. 627 (1946); Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-
Action, 34 NoTRE DAME LAw. 303 (1959); Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enter-
prise, 31 U. Car. L. REv. 103, 107-12 (1963). Significant case law on point includes 
Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947); Ex parte Riggins, 134 
Fed. 404, 409 (N.D. Ala. 1904); United States v. Given, 25 Fed. Cas. 1324 (No. 15210) 
(C.C.D. Del. 1873); United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79, 81·82 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D. 
Ala. 1871). 
The possible significance of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment should also be 
examined in view of Dean Griswold's analysis of § 2 of the fifteenth amendment. 
Hearings on S. 480, S. 2750, and S. 2979 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 138·53 (1962). 
Also of considerable relevance are GEllHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS clJ. 9 (1960); PEKELIS, 
Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAw AND SociAL AcnoN 91 
(1950); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 
(1954). 
7 378 U.S. at 326. 
'I d. at 333. 
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author of the decision to exclude the Negroes.9 In any case Mr. 
Justice Black was on solid footing when he held that the exclusionary 
decision could not be imputed to Maryland, and since Hooper, not 
Maryland, had refused service to the Negroes, there could be no 
basis for proceeding further into the case. Arbitrary or not, in-
vidious or not, capricious and unassociated with any compelling 
proprietary interest or not, Hooper's action was simply unaffected 
by anything in the fourteenth amendment. 
Finally, Mr. Justice Black directed his attention to the only 
visible connection between Maryland and Hooper, namely, the 
executive and judicial application of the state's nondiscriminatory 
trespass statute which safeguarded Hooper's decision. Mr. Justice 
Black quickly eliminated that connection as sufficient to impute the 
restaurateur's decision to Maryland: 
To avert personal feuds and violent brawls [our society] ... has led 
its people to believe and expect that wrongs against them will be 
vindicated in the courts. Instead of attempting to take the law 
into their own hands, people have been taught to call for police 
protection to protect their rights wherever possible.... None of 
our past cases justifies reading the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
way that might well penalize citizens who are law-abiding enough 
to call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using 
their own physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve 
their rights.10 
The point seems eminently well taken. No reasonable person 
would contend that Maryland's even-handed willingness to apply its 
trespass statute to protect or vindicate Hooper made his decision to 
exclude Negroes the decision of Maryland. Maryland enforced the 
decision, but it clearly did not make the decision. 
In view of all of this, it was forebearing of Mr. Justice Black to 
have refrained from ridiculing his three brothers who went on to 
balance the interests and scrutinize the fairness of Hooper's conduct 
• Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th 
Cir. 1960). See also Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 
373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Pennsylvania 
v, Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Screws v. United States, 325 
U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
10 378 U.S. at 327-28. 
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almost as though the fourteenth amendment applied to Hooper 
himself, and not merely to Maryland. Evidently these straying 
Justices bypassed the threshold prerequisite of "state action" which 
is necessary to legitimate that further inquiry. Evidently they ig-
nored the language and limitations of the fourteenth amendment 
which the Court has often restated: 
The provisions of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution we 
have quoted all have reference to State action exclusively, and not 
to any action of private individuals.11 
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter 
of the amendment.l2 
[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of 
the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely pri-
vate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.1a 
[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to 
the Equal Protection Clause ... ,14 
II 
It is true, of course, that three of these celebrated quotations are 
taken from cases in which they were dicta, cases where the Court in 
fact found reviewable state action, proceeded to the merits, and 
applied the fourteenth amendment in behalf of equal protection 
claims. It is likewise true that the fourth case, the Civil Rights 
CasesP involved the constitutionality of a federal statute under 
section five of the fourteenth amendment. There the Court actually 
presumed that the states did not enforce or protect a conflicting pro-
prietary claim.16 No matter. The dicta are firmly based on the 
clear language of the fourteenth amendment. They were bound to 
be applied when put to a proper test as in Bell and Cutter Labs. 
Nevertheless, while Mr. Justice Black's analysis in Bell is clearly 
11 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879). 
12 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
18 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
u Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). See also other 
cases cited in note 2 supra. 
lG 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
,. "[H]is rights .. may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State 
for redress. An individual ... may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of 
the right in a particular case [but] ••. he will only render himself amenable to sa tis· 
faction or punishment; and amenable therefore to the Jaws of the State where the 
wrongful acts are committed." ld. at 17. 
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the same type of analysis as that implicit in the brief majority treat-
ment of Cutter Labs., Mr. Justice Black actually joined in a dis-
senting opinion in the latter case. Even more strange is the fact 
that that dissent turned on a weighing and balancing of the rival 
interests of the private litigants. The dissenters did not draw up 
short of a treatment of the merits, even though they knew perfectly 
well that it had been the owners of Cutter Laboratories rather than 
the State of California who had fired the petitioner. To the con-
trary, they briefly reviewed the petitioner's interest in freedom of 
political association, they noted the absence of evidence suggesting 
that Cutter Laboratories had some legitimate reason for dispensing 
with her services, and they would have applied the due process clause 
to bar the employer's discharge decision from taking effect. More-
over, in refusing to boggle over the state action prerequisite, the 
dissent in Cutter Labs. expressly relied on Shelley v. Kraemei17 as 
precedent.18 Since Mr. Justice Black had voted with a unanimous 
Court in Shelley, it is not surprising that he would approve of its 
citation in the Cutter Labs. dissent. The surprise is, rather, that 
Shelley itself held a state responsible for denying equal protection in 
the mere application of a common law rule which safeguarded a 
private covenantee's own current easement in real property. Shelley 
held that certain privately acquired, bargained-for property rights of 
private citizens could not be enforced by any state, when such en-
forcement would frustrate a purchaser's interest in acquiring and 
holding the affected property without disqualification because of 
race or color.19 The Court in Shelley did not, as it assuredly could 
not, impute to the state the particular willingness of Kraemer to 
bargain away an i~cident of ownership in return for an identical 
easement against co-covenantors. As in Bell, "no [state] ... law, no 
municipal ordinance, and no official proclamation or action of any 
kind [showed] ... the slightest state coercion of, or encouragement 
to,"20 the private decision-makers in Shelley. Rather, it was merely 
"in granting judicial enforcement"21 to a wholly private decision to 
17 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
18 351 U.S. at 302-03. 
1° Compare Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 328·31 (1964) (Mr. Justice Black's dis· 
cussion of Shelley) witlz Brief for Petitioners, pp. 51·57, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 
379 u.s. 306 (1964). 
2o 378 U.S. at 333. 
2 1 334 U.S. at 20. 
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withhold private property from prospective Negro purchasers that 
the state became involved. It was never in doubt that the racial 
animus and the decision to discriminate were supplied solely by 
private parties who were neither coerced nor encouraged by the state. 
So private citizen Kraemer, not Missouri, decided that faithless 
covenantor Ferguson should be bound by his agreement and that 
Shelley should be kept from home ownership because of his race. 
Private corporation Cutter Laboratories, not California, decided 
that its employee should be fired because of her political affiliation. 
What else, if anything, tends to detract from the crystalline correct-
ness of Mr. Justice Black's analysis in Bell? 
In Illinois at one time, private employers were free to forbid 
organizational picketing of their shops when there was no existing 
dispute between the employer and his own employees. No em~ 
ployer was required to forbid such picketing, however, and Illinois 
did not coerce or encourage any employer's decision in any way. If 
a given employer wished to permit such picketing, he was at liberty 
to do so Gust as he was free to hire Communists or serve Negroes). 
On the other hand, if he decided not to allow picketing, he could 
secure an injunction in order to protect his decision. The situation 
in Illinois regarding picketing was therefore analogous to the trespass 
situation in Maryland in the very same respect that Mr. Justice 
Black found to be of critical importance in Bell: any given shop 
owner's decision to impair an interest allegedly protected by the 
fourteenth amendment would have been solely the decision of a 
private party. Since the decision of such an employer could not 
honorably have been imputed to Illinois, which had neither en-
couraged nor coerced his decision, the fourteenth amendment evi-
dently could not have been involved in a case arising from the 
state's protection of that decision. Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
should have dismissed any appeal taken by pickets who had been 
enjoined from refusing to honor an employer's decision to bar 
them from picketing in front of his private shop. Certainly there 
would seem to have been no occasion to waste time by considering 
the pickets' due process claim on the merits; no matter how 
unreasonable the employer's decision might have been or how sub-
stantial the interests of the pickets, the case would seem to have 
been no more reviewable than had a cruel and arbitrary plague, 
rather than the employer, intervened to halt the picketing. Private 
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decisions and plagues, as we have noted, evidently raise no four-
teenth amendment issues. 
Curiously, however, seven members of the Supreme Court did 
not reach this result in AFL v. Swing,22 decided in 1941. Instead, 
they briefly assessed the competing interests of the employers and 
union organizers, concluded that the union's interest in peaceful 
and non-defamatory picketing outweighed the needs of the em-
ployers to be free of such harassment, applied the due process clause, 
and reversed the judgment below. Mr. Justice Black concurred. 
The case was cited and relied upon with Mr. Justice Black's ap-
proval in Shelley23 in 1948, and, as previously noted, Shelley in turn 
was relied upon by the dissent in Cutter Labs.24 in 1956, again with 
Mr. Justice Black's approval. 
Perhaps, however, the surface inconsistency of these cases does 
not detract from the soundness of Mr. Justice Black's 1964 opinion 
in Bell where he dealt so differently with the prerequisite of state 
action. Or perhaps he has simply altered his position for the better, 
with the correct approach being that taken by him in Bell. In each 
case, to be sure, something desired by some persons was denied or 
taken away at the instance of other private persons who lacked any 
collateral tie with the state and whose decisions were neither en~ 
couraged nor coerced by the state. Perhaps Mr. Justice Black would 
now feel that such actions as those of Kraemer, Swing, and Cutter 
Laboratories would fail to raise a substantial federal question.25 
There is still another, more recent case, however, which is also 
difficult to square with the relentless logic of prerequisite state action 
developed by Mr. Justice Black in Bell. That case is New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.26 
In Alabama, as in most states, private citizens enjoy a certain 
•• 312 u.s. 321 (1941). 
01 334 U.S. at 17. 
•• See note 18 supra. 
•• Of course the Swing case permits an easy orthodox distinction because the picket-
ing occurred on a public sidewalk rather than inside Swing's shop. See, e.g., Kunz v. 
New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 295 (1940); Hague v. 
CIO. 307 U.S. 495 (1939). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 
U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney v. Empire Storage &: Ice Co., 335 U.S. 490 (1949). 
Nevertheless, note where the protected speech occurred in Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 
U.S. 157, 185, 196-204 (1961) (concurring opinion); Marsh v. Alabama, 325 U.S. 501 
(1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Compare Commonwealth v. Davis, 
162 Mass. 570, 39 N.E. 113 (1895) . 
•• 376 u.s. 254 (1954). 
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right to be free from defamatory utterances which they find offensive. 
These citizens are neither encouraged nor coerced by the state to 
refuse to consent to such treatment, however, or to invoke the state's 
libel laws upon being defamed without advance consent. As a matter 
of fact, a resident of Alabama is every bit as free to permit other per-
sons to impugn his reputation as a storekeeper in Maryland is to per-
mit Negroes to remain in his restaurant. Alabama does nothing 
more to encourage its residents to do anything about libellants, than 
Maryland does to encourage its restaurateurs to exclude Negroes. In 
this respect, Alabama also takes the same disinterested position with 
respect to libel as Missouri did in Shelley regarding Negroes; Mis-
souri covenantees were free to allow Negroes to live next door, just 
as Alabama libellees are free to allow other persons to defame them. 
In each case, the individual alone decides whether adequate pro-
tection of his own best interests requires that some law, such as the 
common law of libel, property, or trespass, be applied in a manner 
which necessarily subordinates the conflicting interests of others. 
When the New York Times defamed Mr. Sullivan in Alabama, 
and Mr. Sullivan-like Mr. Kraemer of Missouri and Mr. Swing of 
Illinois in their cases-decided freely to discipline the Times through 
"a civil lawsuit between private parties,"27 it should have surprised 
no one that the Alabama Supreme Court declined to consider any 
argument of the defendant based upon the fourteenth amendment.28 
The decision to punish the Times and to discourage its editors from 
future assaults on his reputation obviously was made solely by 
Sullivan, not by Alabama. Had the Alabama Supreme Court been 
able to anticipate Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Bell, it might usefully 
have adopted part of his opinion in this sort of paraphrase: 
There is no Alabama law, no municipal ordinance, and no official 
proclamation or action of any kind that shows the slightest state 
coercion of, or encouragement to, Sullivan to discipline the New 
York Times for reflecting adversely upon his reputation.29 
Then, directing its attention to the only visible connection between 
Alabama and Sullivan, viz., the judicial application of the state's 
common law rule against libel, the Alabama court might quickly 
-----·------~-----------·--·--~ - -
27 ld.at265. 
•• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 676, 144 So. 2d 25, 40 (1962), rev'd, 
376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
•• See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
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have eliminated that connection as sufficient to impute Sullivan's 
decision to Alabama by paraphrasing another passage of Mr. Justice 
Black's opinion in Bell: 
To avert personal feuds and violent brawls our society has led its 
people to believe and expect that wrongs against them will be 
vindicated in the courts. Instead of attempting to take the law 
into their own hands, people have been taught to seek the pro-
tection o£ the courts wherever possible. None of our past cases 
justifies reading the fourteenth amendment in a way that might 
well penalize citizens who are law-abiding enough to call upon the 
law instead of using their own physical strength or dangerous 
weapons to preserve their rights.so 
That approach certainly would have been just as applicable in the 
New York Times case as it was in Bell. The fourteenth amendment 
should not have been interpreted in a manner which would have en-
couraged Sullivan to seek private vengeance against those who 
libelled him rather than turn to the courts for vindication of his 
reputational rights in an orderly fashion. 
Although the Alabama Supreme Court did not have the benefit 
of this wisdom, it nevertheless made the proper finding according to 
the orthodoxy of Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Bell. It noted that 
"the Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not 
private action."31 And the facts clearly established that Sullivan's 
decision not to consent to the Times' libel and to invoke the 
protection of the state courts could not be imputed to Alabama. 
Accordingly, it affirmed the judgment in favor of Sullivan without 
embarking upon a lengthy balancing of Sullivan's interests in reputa-
tional integrity against the Times' interests in publication. Such a 
balancing operation seemingly would have served no useful purpose. 
In withholding consent from the Times and suing for damages 
under Alabama law, Sullivan may have deprived the Times of free-
dom of speech, but Sullivan, of course, is not subject to the four-
teenth amendment! 
The Supreme Court of the United States viewed the case some-
what differently. In a single terse paragraph, which, incidentally, 
cited the Swing case, the Court declared that Alabama rather than 
Sullivan had acted in a manner allegedly depriving the Times of 
80 See text accompanying note 10 supra. 
81 273 Ala. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 40. 
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freedom of speech.32 It then proceeded to weigh the competing 
interests of the parties at considerable length, and concluded that 
consistent with substantive due process, the New York Times could 
not be barred from publishing the type of statement which Sullivan 
found objectionable. Consequently, it reversed the judgment in 
favor of Sullivan on constitutional grounds. Mr. Justice Black not 
only concurred in the decision, but wanted to provide even more 
fourteenth amendment protection than that provided by the ma-
jority.33 The New York Times decision came down just three 
months before Mr. Justice Black dissented in Bell for want of suffi-
cient state action to reach the merits. 
III 
No doubt certain distinctions lend themselves to a rationalization 
of the cases discussed above. Many such distinctions have been sug-
gested in the vast periodical literature which has been fascinated 
u "The first (ground asserted to insulate the judgment of the Alabama courts from 
constitutional scrutiny] is the proposition relied on by the State Supreme Court-that 
'The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State action and not private action.' 
That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit 
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which 
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of 
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and 
that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. • • • TI1e test is not the 
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such 
power has in fact been exercised." 376 U.S. at 265. 
Note that it was enough that a common law rule was applied to mediate con• 
flicting claims of right "between private parties.'' The Court did not find reviewable 
state action by relying upon the fact that the plaintiff was a state official (a police 
commissioner), or that the state could be described as seeking to suppress criticism 
of itself to the extent that it granted damages for libel directed to the official conduct 
of one of its own functionaries. It is significant that the Court did not take this easy 
means of isolating the reviewable element of state action. Had it done so, the Court 
would have left itself open to difficulty in extending the holding of the case to 
protect non-malicious libel directed against candidates for office, who are not state 
officials and whose criticized conduct could not possibly be attributed to the state. 
The case is almost certain to afford such protection, since the rationale was stated in 
terms of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," and the need for "breathing 
space" and protest regarding "major public issues," even when such debate and 
protest contains carelessly made false statements injurious to others. 376 U.S. at 
270-83. See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: "The Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and The 
Law of Libel: The Modem Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964). A rule 
insisting that negligent defamation of an incumbent directed to his official conduct is 
constitutionally protected. but that negligent defamation of his opponent regarding his 
qualifications for office is not equally protected, would be an unthinkable warping of 
fair political comment. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). 
83 376 U.S. at293. 
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with the state action conundrum.34 None of these distinctions, how-
ever, ultimately serves to excuse Mr. Justice Black's unique failure 
to examine the fundamental fairness of the Maryland trespass law 
as applied in Bell. For there was in that case, as there is in every 
case where conflicting claims of right are mediated by state law, suffi-
cient state involvement to bring the case within the threshold of 
constitutional review. And if the trespass convictions in Bell were 
u In addition to the materials cited in note 6 supra, see Abernathy, Expansion of 
the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375 
(1958); Alfange, "Under Color of Law": Classic and Screws Revisited, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 
395 (1962); Barnett, What is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution1 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945); Berle, 
Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from 
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952); Carl, Reflections 
on the "Sit-Ins," 46 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1961); Gilbert, Theories of State Action as 
Applied to the "Sit-In" Cases, 17 ARK. L. REv. 147 (1963); Hale, Force and the State: 
A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 149 
(1935); Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-In: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L. REv. 435 
(1964); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 
473 (1962); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. 
PA. L. REv. 637 (1961); Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimi-
nation in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1964); Horowitz, The Misleading 
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 
(1957); Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REv. 555 
(1951); Karst & Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. justice Douglas, 
Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762 (1962); Lewis, The Role of Law in Regulating 
Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 402 (1964); 
Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 101; Lewis, Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1458 
(1961); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Cowr.r. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Manning, 
Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular 
Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38 (1960); Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203 (1949); Paulsen, 
The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 137; 
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal 
Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315; Rice, Sit-Ins: Proceed with Caution, 
29 Mo. L. REv. 39 (1964); St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look 
at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicH L. REv. 
993 (1961); Schwelb, The Sit-In Demonstration: Criminal Trespass or Constitutional 
Right1, 36 N.Y.UL. REv. 779 (1961); Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic 
Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 
(1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 
1 (1959); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 
70 YALE L.J. 345 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347 
(1963); Comment, A Statement Against State Action, 37 So. CAL L. REv. 463 (1964); 
Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action Concept, 44 CALIF. L. 
REv. 718 (1956); Comment, Lunch Counter Demonstrations: State Action and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 VA. L. REv. 105 (1961); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Equal Protection-Racial Discrimination and the Role of the State, 59 MicH. L. REv. 
1054 (1961); Note, State Action, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956); Note, Applicability of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to Private Organizations, 61 HARV. L. REv. 344 (1948). 
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reconcilable with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, it could only have been because the state's mediation of 
the conflicting claims of right was sufficiently reasonable under the 
circumstances. It could not have been because the reasonableness 
of the scheme was not reviewable by the Court for lack of requisite 
state action, as Mr. Justice Black thought. 
The action to be reviewed in a fourteenth amendment case does 
not, of course, inhere in the decision of a private citizen to deny 
something to others when that decision meets with the acquiescence 
of those whom it adversely affects. If the matter is carried no 
further than that, there is-by definition-no clash of interests which 
the state is called upon to mediate and no case or controversy to be 
carried to the Supreme Court for review. Such would have been the 
case in Bell had Hooper's decision not to serve Negroes been 
unopposed by the contention of the Negroes involved that they were 
entitled to service. Reviewable state action does inhere, however, in 
the manifestly public act explicit in every state decision to deny 
something which persons claim as a matter of right, as when Negroes 
maintain that they are entitled to enter into certain commercial 
transactions as a matter of right, regardless of race and regardless of 
a seller's feeling about race. And whether the state's decision to 
deny the claimed right is based upon some state policy which seeks 
to protect interests of the state, or upon some state policy which 
seeks to protect purely private interests opposed to the asserted claim 
of right, it equally involves a policy of the state. In every case, the 
state policy is permissible under the fourteenth amendment only if 
it is consistent with standards of due process and equal protection. 
Accordingly, the Court cannot avoid an inquiry into the reasonable· 
ness of the manner in which the state has classified competing private 
interests, some of which it has preferred and established as "rights," 
and others of which it has subordinated. 
So the decision to be reviewed for constitutional reasonableness 
in fourteenth amendment cases is solely the decision of the state, 
manifest in the law which is employed by the state to mediate the 
conflicting claims (or decisions, if you like) of private parties. The 
decision to be reviewed in such cases is the decision-in-law of the 
state to establish one freedom and disestablish another, and the issue 
is whether that decision-in-law is fundamentally reasonable, i.e.1 
whether it classifies and treats the interests with which it is con-
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cemed, preferring some and subordinating others, in a fashion con• 
sistent with due process and equal protection. 
The issue in Bell was not whether Hooper acted in an arbitrary 
fashion from a point of view which takes into consideration only his 
interests, but whether Maryland was arbitrary in its classification of 
the "rights" of property owners and the "duties" of customers under 
the circumstances, i.e., whether the state was arbitrary in its dis· 
positive point of view with respect to the interests of all the parties. 
The issue in Swing was not whether Swing's wish to be free of pickets 
was unreasonable from his point of view, but whether Illinois was 
unreasonable in defining the "rights" of shopkeepers and the 
"duties" of union organizers in a manner which made Swing's point 
of view count for everything and the union interests count for 
nothing. The issue in Cutter Labs. was not whether Cutter acted 
unreasonably when it decided to fire one of its employees because of 
her political affiliation, but whether California had a sufficient reason 
under the circumstances for its decision to prefer the business 
interests of employers over the conflicting interests of employees in 
the manner provided for in its law of contracts. The issue in Shelley 
was not whether the Kraemers' antagonism regarding Negro neigh· 
bors was unreasonable from their point of view, but whether Mis-
souri's law respecting enforceable covenants was reasonable under 
the circumstances, taking into consideration the points of view of 
the prospective Negro purchaser and the willing seller.35 And fi. 
nally, of course, the issue in the New York Times case was not 
whether Sullivan should have "permitted" the Tim-es to impugn 
his official conduct, but whether Alabama's law of libel unreasonably 
protected reputational interests at the expense of free speech. The 
issue in such cases as these, in short, is the constitutionality of oper· 
ative governmental policies, manifest in laws which mediate con-
flicting personal claims of right. 
Before a case involving conflicting claims of right reaches the 
Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment, it will have been 
tentatively resolved according to some state law. That law will have 
been utilized to determine "whose conduct is entitled to the 'law's 
protection' "36 as between two or more human beings whose con-
flicting interests and proposed decisions and conduct are mutually 
•• See Van Alstyne &: Karst, supra note 34 at 44-49. 
•• 378 U.S. at 312. See also Paulsen, supra note 34 at 164. 
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exclusive under the circumstances. Whatever answer that law has 
propounded, it will be final only if the value preferences implicit 
in the answer are within the range of choices open to the state under 
the fourteenth amendment, i.e., only if the state's operative policy 
is consistent with due process and equal protection. In order to 
pass upon that consistency, the Court must necessarily review the 
reasonableness of the state's policy as applied through the law which 
was used to decide whose conduct is entitled to protection. This, 
of course, is precisely the approach in which Mr. Justice Black has 
repeatedly concurred in such cases as Swing, Shelley, Cutter Labs., 
and New York Times. 
A further review of the Swing case may make the matter clearer. 
The State of Illinois has classified people in a tremendous variety of 
ways, according to many different tests and for many different pur-
poses. It not only has established broad legal categories or classifi-
cations, e.g., "buyers" and "sellers," it also has established operative 
classifications further refining these categories, e.g., "sellers of securi-
ties" and "buyers of stolen goods.'' Whether each such classification 
and the concomitant recognition of rights, privileges, duties, powers 
and immunities which attach to membership in it are constitutional, 
depends in each case upon the fundamental reasonableness of the 
classification. Whether each given classification is fundamentally 
reasonable depends, in turn, on a variety of considerations which the 
Supreme Court usually regards as relevant. The relevance of these 
considerations, moreover, does not depend upon any connection 
which the state may have with either party other than through the 
law which fixes their operative rights and duties. In the Swing case, 
for instance, the Court might have assessed the state's apportionment 
of "rights" and "duties" between shopkeepers and union organizers 
in terms of these typical questions: 
(1) What policies within the legitimate concern of the state are served in 
its current treatment of conflicting employer and union interests? 
(2) How is the particular grouping of legal interests explicit in Illinois' 
allocation of rights and duties respecting picketing related to those 
policies? 
(3) What is the character and extent of adversity endured by those sub-
ject to the particular duty imposed by this law? 
(4) What alternative means, if any, are available to the state adequately 
to protect certain employer interests which it should be free to protect 
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without, however, hampering union interests to the extent inherent 
in the present scheme? 
(5) To what extent do considerations of federalism, the special character 
of the problem, or other matters oblige the Court to refrain from 
substituting its judgment for that of the state legislature, or from 
reaching the merits? 
Once these and perhaps other considerations were taken into con-
sideration in reviewing the reasonableness of the Illinois law, the 
Court was in a position to arrive at its decision. Conversely, had 
these considerations not been raised and resolved, no reasonable 
decision would have been possible. 
The breadth of the decision in a given case may vary, of course, 
again depending on a number of considerations which are always a 
part of the judicial process. For instance, the decision may be· a 
narrow one if the Court perceives distinctions in the case which 
would not have equal significance if certain facts were altered. It 
may also be narrow if the case being reviewed is relatively novel and 
the Court is reluctant to foreclose consideration of related cases 
which it cannot clearly anticipate. On the other hand, the decision 
may be broad to the extent that the Court is concerned with its 
workload and reluctant to entertain a series of line-drawing sequels 
to the case at hand, or to the extent that a broader rule would better 
serve the educative function of the Court or better advise legislators 
who cannot be expected to master the minutiae of finely drawn dis-
tinctions. Technically, the decision may be, as it was in Swing, 
merely to reverse the state supreme court's affirmance of an injunc-
tion. In so doing, however, the Court in Swing held the Illinois 
law which authorized that injunction unconstitutional as applied. 
Thus, as a matter of stare decisis, the case stands for the proposition 
that no state may impose a duty upon persons to refrain from peace-
ful and nondefamatory organizational picketing at the request of an 
employer, even in the absence of a controversy between that em-
ployer and his mrn employees. What was it that was reviewed and 
found wanting under the fourteenth amendment in the Swing 
case? It was a law and a policy of Illinois, nothing more and nothing 
less. 
But what of the reason advanced by Mr. Justice Black in Bell 
for not wanting to review the law of Maryland in the same fashion? 
Shouldn't the Court have upheld the Illinois law in Swing in order 
236 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1965: 219 
to refrain from penalizing "citizens who are law-abiding enough to 
call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using 
their own physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve their 
rights"?37 Wasn't it likely that Swing would attempt to disperse the 
pickets himself, after learning that the state could not protect his 
"rights"? Perhaps it was, but it would have begged the whole ques-
tion for the Court to rely upon the apprehension of such conduct 
as a reason to uphold the law. It would also have assumed that the 
Court must condone unconstitutional injustice in one case for want 
of authority to prevent violence in some other case, even though it 
has not been shown that: (a) such violence is likely to occur; (b) the 
Court would lack means of correcting the violence if it did occur; 
or (c) the threat of violence in some other case is a sufficient reason 
to deny a constitutional right in the case at hand. 
The first of these propositions could not safely be assumed in 
either Swing or Bell. The third proposition has been flatly contra-
dicted by the Court's unanimous position in the violent aftermath of 
Brown v. Board of Education.38 The second proposition indulges a 
presumption which is probably false; any subsequent outbreak of 
violence is very likely to result in another case which will once again 
permit the Court to review the manner in which the state has medi-
ated conflicting personal claims of right. 
Assume, for instance, that after the Swing case, Illinois had re-
vamped its law so as no longer to authorize injunctions on behalf of 
employers who have requested union organizers to refrain from 
picketing their shops. Instead, suppose it had enacted a new statute 
merely recognizing an employer's "privilege" to use any force neces-
sary in order to remove pickets from in front of his business estab-
lishment and denying the "right" to recover damages to any picket 
injured under such circumstances. Assume further that a case 
subsequently had arisen in whic~ an employer had inflicted personal 
injuries upon a picket in order to discourage him from picketing, 
81 378 U.S. at 328. 
88 349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
"[C]onstitutional rights, .. are not to be sacrificed •Jr yielded to. violence and 
disorder " Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1. 16 (1958). 
"[I]mportant as is the preservation of the public peace, this a1m cannot be accom· 
plished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal 
Constitution." Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917). 
See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 
327 n.9 (1951) (dissenting opinion); Hague v. CIO, 307 V S. 496 (1939). 
VoL 1965: 219] CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 237 
the picket had sued for damages in a state court, the court had dis-
missed the action in accordance with the revised Illinois law, and 
the state supreme court had affirmed per curiam. The plaintiff 
would have applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, alleging that the Illinois "employer-privilege" statute had 
deprived him of substantive due process and denied him the equal 
protection of the laws. What would have been the result? Would 
the state statute in question have been less arbitrary than the one 
which preceded it? Clearly it would have been more arbitrary, for 
the state could no longer have urged that its law was based in part 
on a policy of avoiding violence in labor disputes-a policy which 
arguably tended to make its original law somewhat more reasonable. 
If anything, this case would have been easier than the Swing case; 
the statute would have been doomed. But that is not really the 
point. The point is, rather, that when the Court applied the four-
teenth amendment in the Swing case to invalidate the state's common 
law rule providing for injunctive protection of employers, it did not 
in the least imply that a different scheme, even more invitive of 
violence, would pass constitutional muster. 
Precisely the same observations can be made with respect to Bell. 
In striking down the Maryland trespass statute as applied in that 
case, the Court most certainly would not have authorized the state.to 
apply some other law, even more arbitrary in its classification of 
"ownership rights" and "customer duties," to protect Hooper. 
Mr. Justice Black's principal analytical shortcoming in Bell was 
his unexamined assumption that the trespass statute in question was 
bottomed on a reasonable classification of rival proprietary and 
customer interests. He assumed that it was reasonable for the state 
to protect the discriminatory prerogatives of corporate restaurateurs 
and to subordinate the prerogatives of those who seek commercial 
services. Given that assumption, of course, it followed that the 
trespass convictions should be affirmed. At no point, however, did 
Mr. Justice Black address himself to the question which his assump-
tion bypassed: was the state's classification of those claimed p~eroga­
tives reasonable under the circumstances?39 
88 The nearest that Mr. Justice Black comes to addressing himself to this question 
is his statement that "the Amendment does not forbid a State to prosecute for crimes 
committed against a person or his property, however prejudiced or narrow the victim's 
views may be.'' 378 U.S. at 327. However, this response is itself grounded on 
challengeable assumptions. The initial assumption is either (a) that the property 
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Had the Court held the Maryland trespass statute unconstitu· 
tional as applied, it necessarily would have done so because the state's 
classification of "incidents of ownership" and "customer duties," 
manifest in its trespass law, was arbitrary under the circumstances. 
In making such a determination, the Court would have addressed 
itself to a series of questions similar to those which were advanced 
earlier as possibly present in the Court's analysis of the Swing case. 
Thus, the issues which Mr. Justice Black should have discussed in 
Bell are these: 
(I) What policies within the legitimate concern of the state are manifest 
in the state's trespass law which mediates conflicting proprietary and 
customer interests? 
(2) How is the trespass law's allocation of rights and duties respecting 
service in places of public accommodation related to those policies? 
(3) What is the character and degree of hardship which must be endured 
by those persons who are subject to the duties imposed by the law? 
(4) What alternative means, if any, are available to the state adequately 
to protect legitimate proprietary interests without, however, subordi-
nating legitimate customer interests to the extent inherent in the 
present scheme? 
(5) To what extent do considerations of federalism, the special character 
of the problem, practical limitations on the Court's power, or other 
matters, oblige the Court to refrain from subordinating state policies 
to those of the fourteenth amendment on this occasion? 
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion recognized the duty of the Court 
to confront these questions, and it resolved them against Maryland.40 
"belongs" to the owner in accordance with principles found elsewhere than in the 
law of the state, and hence not within the purview of the fourteenth amendment, or 
(b) that the state is adhering to due process and equal protection when it grants an 
absolutely enforceable, exclusionary privilege to absentee corporate "owners," and 
treats conflicting interests which are asserted as "criminal." lVith respect to (a), see 
BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111·13 (Ogden ed. 1931); Hecht, supra note 34. 
With respect to (b), see Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 196-204 (1961) (concurring 
opinion); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 
(1940); Berle, supra note 34; Manning, supra note 34. 
Moreover, the latter part of Mr. Justice Black's statement appears to imply that the 
owner in such a case is merely being protected by the state in order to safeguard his 
right to hold a personal prejudice rather than to protect some impersonal business 
calculation, and that the state is merely protecting the owner's right to hold such a 
"view" rather than his attempt to assert that view through discriminatory action. 
As to the nature of the belief allegedly protected by the state, see 378 U.S. at 245·46, 
271-78 (opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas). With regard to whether the state in such 
cases is protecting a prejudiced belief or discriminatory action, compare Bell with 
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) and Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
•• 378 l·.S. at 311·12. Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion is outlined here in order to 
demonstrate how he resolved the questions appropriate!} raised b) the equal protection 
claim. and not to sugge~t that a different resolution would have been unreasonable. 
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According to Mr. Justice Goldberg, the limitations imposed on state 
power by the equal protection clause dictate that no state may sub-
ordinate customer interests in commercial service to proprietary 
interests in refusing to deal when 
(a) the establishment where such service is sought is generally open to the 
public at large; 
(b) the service is of an impersonal, casual, and occasional nature; 
(c) the owners or managers who seek to refuse service are not personally 
involved in rendering that service; 
(d) the service sought would contribute to the material comfort and well-
being of those interested in it; 
(e) those seeking service are wholly unobjectionable other than because 
of their race or color; and 
(f) the proprietary interests involved are unlikely to suffer from compe-
tition by similar establishments, in which customer interests in service 
must be equally respected.41 
In passing upon the constitutional acceptability of the Maryland 
trespass statute, Mr. Justice Goldberg was necessarily concerned with 
the claimed prerogatives of private proprietors and those of private 
customers. He would have been derelict not to be so concerned, for 
the fairness of the manner in which those competing personal claims 
of right were tentatively mediated by the State of Maryland, through 
its trespass statute, could not possibly have been determined absent 
an assessment of the claims of right themselves. Whether the tres-
pass statute constituted an unreasonable limitation of customer pre-
rogatives manifestly could not have been determined without eval-
uating the respective interests of the parties, meaning the parties 
whose conduct was affected by the trespass statute.42 In precisely the 
His historical arguments, for instance, are far from conclusive. 378 U.S. at 288-311. 
Compare Mr. Justice Black's opinion in this regard. Id. at 335-41. See also Paulsen, 
supra note 34, at 151-58. 
n 378 U.S. at 312-15. 
'"See Traynor, supra note 34, at 238. See also Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 
U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring): 
Judicial enforcement is of course state action, but this is not the end of the 
inquiry. The ultimate substantive question is whether there has been 'State 
action of a particular character' •.. -whether the character of the State's involv-
ment in an arbitrary discrimination is such that it should be held responsible 
for the discrimination. 
This limitation on the scope of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment serves several vital functions in our system. Underlying the cases 
involving an alleged denial of equal protection by ostensibly private action is 
a clash of competing constitutional claims of a high order: liberty and equality. 
Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and 
dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even 
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same fashion in the New Yo1·k Times case, competing personal repu-
tational and free speech claims were subjected to judicial evaluation 
with reference to the Alabama libel rule. 
In the very same sense, every fourteenth amendment decision-
no matter how orthodox-considers and affects private interests, 
private conduct, and prerogatives of making efficacious private de-
unjust in his personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of 
protection from governmental interference. This liberty would be overridden, 
in the name of equality, if the strictures of the Amendment were applied to 
governmental and private action without distinction. Id. at 249·50. (Emphasis 
added in part.) 
As a general proposition, Mr. Justice Harlan's eloquent statement presents a highly 
relevant and valuable consideration in the proper analysis of fourteenth amendment 
cases. Along with Professor Karst, I have attempted to respect it. See Van Alstyne &: 
Karst, supra note 34, at 8, 14-22, 34·36, 41-44, 46·47. The portion of the opinion 
italicized above, however, is somewhat misleading. 
As a purely practical matter, whether anyone has a meaningful "right" to act 
capriciously in the context of a conflict, i.e., when the necessary effect of that act is to 
displace conflicting acts proposed by others, may not depend entirely upon his freedom 
from governmental interference. Rather, it may depend wholly upon the willingness 
of local government to interfere to protect that act. 
(F]or legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagina-
tion of a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought 
to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it-just as we talk of the 
force of gravitation accounting for the conduct of bodies in space. One phrase 
adds no more than the other to what we know without it. HoLMES, CoLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 313 (1920). 
(O]nly those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back o£ 
them.... United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) 
(Mr. Justice Jackson). 
See also Bingham, The Nature of Legal Rights and Duties, 12 MicH. L. REv. 1, 7, 15 
(1913); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
Barring a condition of social anarchy in which "rights" are effectively determined 
by the comparative brute strength of antagonistic parties, the establishment or dis· 
establishment of a private claim of right is therefore a function of government "inter-
ference." Necessarily, a state "should be held responsible" (in the words of Mr. 
Justice Harlan) whether it employs its power to interfere against the claim of right 
to equality by defending the claim to liberty, or whether it employs its power to 
interfere against the claim of right to liberty by defending the claim to equality. 
The question remains which, if either, "interference" deprives persons of liberty 
without due process or denies persons the equal protection of the laws? Whose con· 
duct, if that of either party, is entitled to protection under the fourteenth amend· 
ment? Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion may imply that it is the liberty o£ the property 
owner which is constitutionally entitled to protection. Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion 
in Bell, on the other hand, holds that it is the competing claim of equality which is 
constitutionally entitled to protection. 
It is entirely possible, however, that in many contexts where liberty and equality 
clash, neither claim is automatically established by the fourteenth amendment, because 
(again, in Mr. Justice Harlan's words) not all claims of liberty or equality are "consti· 
tutional claims of a high order," or in fact constitutional claims at all. Precisely these 
conflicts may be reserved for state resolution alone. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: 
Notes for a Revised Opinion, IIO U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962). 
Vol 1965: 219] CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 241 
cisions. For instance, if the Court invalidates a state rate regulation 
which pegs railway tariffs at a level lower than that which the Court 
determines to be consistent with substantive due process, the effect 
is necessarily one of vindicating certain economic interests of rail-
ways at the expense of the economic interests of shippers and others 
who have benefited from the restriction on the carriers' prerogative to 
bargain for higher rates. Although it is the state's law which is in-
validated, the Court's ·decision necessarily constitutes a Supreme 
Court evaluation and rearrangement of competing private interests 
and conduct and the permissible latitude of private decisions which 
were formerly dependent on that law for their status as "rights" or 
"privileges." The essential point remains: those interests-those 
claimed prerogatives-have no constitutional claim to status as oper-
ative rights or privileges if they were established by the state in 
accordance with a policy which is fundamentally unfair or arbi-
trary.48 The same reasoning applies in Bell. If we object to the 
power of the Supreme Court to make these determinations, then our 
objection is really directed toward Cohens v. Virginia44 and every 
other case which has reaffirmed the authority of the Court to invali-
date state laws which it finds incompatible with its notions of consti-
tutional standards. It cannot be contended, however, ·that no re-
viewable state action was involved with respect to the law which was 
invalidated. 
IV 
This article is in part a restatement and elaboration of a highly 
original article written by Professor Harold Horowitz in 1957.45 
In that article, Professor Horowitz effectively discarded the disin-
genuous dicta in Shelley and drew recognition from the case that 
the fourteenth amendment is involved not only when an individual 
asserts a claim of right against a state, but also when he asserts a 
claim of right against the claims of right of other persons and the 
state resolves the conflict according to its policy of what is reasonable 
•• The Court's evaluation of the state policy in question necessarily involves a 
weighing and balancing of competing interests, not altogether different from the task 
originally performed by the legislature which formulated and implemented the policy. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF TilE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-14 (1921); BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGERous BRANCH 34-72 (1962); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 
1960 SuP. CT. REv. 75. 
•• 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
•• Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957). 
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under the circumstances, i.e., according to its law. The legitimacy of 
the state's policy, and the legitimacy of applying that policy in the 
manner provided for to the dispute at hand, are, as Professor Horo· 
witz said then, fully reviewable to determine whether they square 
with standards of due process and equal protection. The issue of 
"state action" for purposes of reviewability having been thus estab· 
lished, it is the duty of the Court to devote its attention to the sole 
remaining issue, viz., "whether the particular state action in the 
particular circumstances, determining legal relations between pri· 
vate persons, is constitutional when tested against the various federal 
constitutional restrictions on state action."41l 
This approach seems to be an entirely sensible formulation, and 
happily a number of commentators have attempted to review the 
acceptability of particular state action under particular circumstances 
accordingly.47 Occasionally, however, the approach has been partly 
obscured by characterizations which may be misleading. Thus, the 
critical question to be considered by the Supreme Court under this 
approach has been formulated in these terms: 
In the given situation, is this the kind of state action that violate~ 
the amendment?4B 
(T]he inquiry is not whether state action is present but whether 
the state action denies equal protection.49 
In fact, however, the question intended to be raised under the due 
process and equal protection clauses is not whether this "is the kind 
of state action that violates the amendment,"ilo for that unduly 
emphasizes the mechanics of manifested state power. It is, rather, 
whether the state's value judgments which are represented by and 
put into effect through its operative laws are permissible judgments 
within the limitations of due process and equal protection. For 
example, was it permissible in the Swing case for Illinois to prefer 
certain employer prerogatives to be free of picketing over union pre· 
rogatives to picket? Was it permissible in Shelley for Missouri to 
prefer the interests of adjoining white home owners over the interests 
46 I d. at 209. 
"See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 42; Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of 
Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1964); Williams, supra 
note 34. 
•• Allen, Critique of "Racial Discrimination in ·Private' Housing," 52 CALIF L. REv. 
46, 47 (1964). 
40 LocKHART. KAMISAR & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1314 (1964). 
6° Allen. mpra note 48. 
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of prospective Negro purchasers? Was it permissible in Cutter Labs. 
for California to prefer the employer's "right" to fire over the em-
ployee's "right" to work? In each case it was the policy preference 
of the state, made operative by its laws, which was under considera-
tion. It was, of course, the operation of those laws which created 
the occasion for Supreme Court review of the state policies, but 
that did not necessitate focusing on the kind of state action, or on 
the state action involved in each case, to the neglect of evaluating the 
competing claims of right which reflected upon the constitutional 
rationality of the state law in question. 
A further distinction should also be observed. State action 
manifest in the ordinary application of a state law, which makes 
every dispute resolved by state law reviewable according to due pro-
cess and equal protection standards, is not to be confused with 
collateral ties which a state may have with one of the parties-ties 
which may have their own distinct bearing on the rationality of the 
law as applied in the case. Such collateral ties, e.g.~ subsidies, leases 
and delegations of governmental functions, may alter the outcome of 
a given case on the merits, since their presence may serve to indicate 
clearly the arbitrariness of a state's policy which prefers some claims 
of right at the expense of others. The absence of any such collateral 
connections, however, does not automatically insulate the state's 
policy ~rom constitutional review, nor does it necessarily establish. 
that the state's policy is sufficiently fair to survive the demands of 
due process and equal protection.51 Thus, a state's policy made 
operative through its law may still lack constitutional support even 
though the state has no collateral tie with either private party, as 
was the case in Swing, Shelley~ Cutter Labs.~ and Bell. 
In Shelley, for example, the Supreme Court held that Missouri's 
policy, operating through its law of enforceable covenants, rested on 
01 As was true in Swing, Shelley and Bell. See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
"[T)here are some modern fourteenth amendment decisions that can be explained 
honestly only by reference to the premise that situations exist in which the states are 
under constitutional compulsion to prevent discrimination by private persons or 
groups." Allen, supra note 48. 
"Another conclusion which must be accepted from the lines of development •.. is 
that as a means of determining whether individual constitutional liberties have been 
violated, the concept of state action has substantially lost its utility." Williams, suprll 
note 34, at 367. 
"The real challenge then is to articulate the standards that must be met by state 
law authorizing private discriminatory action ... " Traynor, supra note 34, at 238. 
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an arbitrary preference of covenantee interests over those of pros-
pective Negro purchasers and faithless covenantors. This was so 
despite the fact that the covenantee in that case had received no 
special benefit from the state, other than through his membership in 
a class of covenant holders whose interests were preferred by the state 
law in question. Had the covenantee been the recipient of addi-
tional benefits, for instance, had he purchased his house from a gov-
ernment agency which bound itself to repurchase the house at any 
time for the original price, such benefits would have made it even 
clearer that the state's law rested on an arbitrary classification of 
interests under the circumstances. This would have been the case 
not because of any significant change in the covenantee's status as a 
private citizen, or because the Court would have fictitiously imputed 
his decision to bar Negro neighbors to the state, but solely because 
the policy of the state in preferring his claim of right over the claims 
of right of the faithless covenantor and the prospective Negro 
purchaser would have been even less reasonable than it was under 
circumstances where the covenantee was not protected against eco-
nomic loss. In short, the fact that the covenantee would have been 
protected against economic loss would have made it even less defensi-
ble for the state to disable Negro purchasers through the application 
of its law of enforceable covenants. 
Note, however, that the possibility of collateral ties between the 
covenantee and the state had no bearing upon whether the Missouri 
law of covenants was reviewable under the fourteenth amendment. 
That reviewability was established by the fact that a law of Missouri 
was employed by Missouri to reject a claim of right that a Negro is 
free to purchase a house from a willing seller, without regard to the 
racial bias of adjoining neighbors. The question then became 
whether Missouri's rejection of that claim was arbitrary. Collateral 
ties between the covenantees and the state would merely have helped 
to make it clearer that that rejection was arbitrary. The absence of 
such ties, however, did not make the case unreviewable and was not 
sufficient to alter the balance when the Supreme Court assessed the 
constitutional rationality of the Missouri law of enforceable cove-
nants as applied. Thus, a collateral state connection with a private 
litigant has no magical quality, it serves no special constitutional 
function, and it raises no distinct problem. Such a connection 
merely presents one additional fact which contributes to an effective 
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weighing and balancing of interests within the permitted latitudes 
of due process and equal protection. Dicta to the contrary probably 
proceed from semantic confusion and vague yearnings to simplify 
matters of constitutional analysis, and those cases which purport to 
have been decided exclusively on the strength of such collateral 
factors have been justifiably criticized as cases which yield no neutral 
principles. r;2 
v 
"State action" traditionally has been assigned a quadripartite 
significance. It has, in practice, meant each of the following: 
(a) Action which is reviewable under the fourteenth amendment and 
which, upon being reviewed, is found to reflect policies consonant 
with due process and equal protection as applied in a given case; 
(b) Action which is reviewable under the fourteenth amendment and 
which, upon being reviewed, is found to reflect policies not consonant 
with due process or equal protection as applied in a given case; 
(c) Action which is reviewable under the fourteenth amendment, but 
with respect to which consideration is deferred because of a self-
imposed judicial policy applicable in certain kinds of cases;53 and 
(d) Action which is wholly unreviewable under the fourteenth amend-
ment for purposes of determining whether it reflects policies con-
sonant with due process and equal protection as applied in a given 
case. 
The burden of this brief aTticle has been to reiterate that this 
fourth categorization is inappropriate under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Its adventitious development in constitutional theory is 
thoroughly regrettable, and its continued use as an analytic construct 
is subject to the following objections: 
First, it is essentially a self-contradictory invention, the use of 
which is unredeemed by the myriad of ad hoc "state action" rulettes 
establishing reviewability on a crazy-quilt basis. 
•• See Wechsler, supra note 34, at 19, 26-35. For further illustrations of un-
warranted emphasis by the Court on collateral factors, see Griffin v. Maryland, 378 
U.S. 130 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 
U.S. 244 (1963); In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. 
denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). 
•• The Court has ample means of avoiding unwelcome cases without resort to the 
fiction of "no-reYiewable state action," which operates to restrict its authority and not 
merely to attest to its discretion. See, e.g., BICKEL. op. cit. supra note 43, at 111-98. 
246 DUKE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 1965: 219 
Second, it has prevented the Supreme Court from proceeding to 
examine due process and equal protection issues on the merits in 
cases where such an examination should have been made. In short, 
its use has sometimes resulted in a knowing or unknowing abdica-
tion of the Court's clear responsibility of constitutional review. 
Third, it has prevented the Court from adequately distinguishing 
between categories (a) and (b), i.e.~ it has corrupted analyses directed 
to the merits and demerits of due process and equal protection 
claims. For instance, it has led some justices virtually to assume 
that the collateral ties between a state and a private litigant which 
they feel must be relied upon merely to render a case reviewable 
automatically establish that a violation of due process or equal 
protection has occurred. Cases in which this occurs are thus fought 
out on the threshold of reviewability, frequently without a sufficient 
examination of the particular arrangement of the conflicting interests 
or of the manner in which those interests were mediated by the state 
in question. On the other hand, it has led other justices to disregard 
the merits in some cases on the presumption that the merits cannot 
be reached at all unless certain collateral ties exist between the state 
and one of the parties to the action. Neither view regarding collat· 
eral ties is proper, but perpetuation of the "no-reviewable state 
action" category has made each inevitable to a certain extent. 
Abandonment of the mythological "no-reviewable state action" 
category will not, as some allege, necessarily increase the Court's 
eventual caseload or make the law of the fourteenth amendment 
hopelessly uncertain or unpredictable. The Court will certainly 
continue to reject appeals and to deny petitions for certiorari for 
want of a substantial federal question whenever it is clear that the 
policy of the state~ manifest in the law under consideration~ does not 
offend due process or deny equal protection~ as applied. For exam-
ple, had the Court considered Cutter Labs. on the merits, it might 
have concluded that the policy of the California law of contracts did 
reflect a constitutionally reasonable apportionment of rights and 
duties, and that the enforceable preference for an employer's free-
dom of action as originally accepted by the union was not an arbi-
trary state resolution of the conflicting employer-employee interests 
under the circumstances. Having so decided, the Court would have 
avoided consideration of "like" cases in the short run. Knowledge· 
able attorneys, correspondingly, would have refrained from pressing 
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"like" cases for review. Similarly, if the Court had found the Cali-
fornia policy arbitrary as applied, that would have established a 
precedent of comparable utility. Whether subsequent cases are 
"like" cases, of course, depends upon the breadth of the holding 
and rationale in the case which operates in a stare decisis fashion. 
The Court would also be justified in refusing to review such cases 
as those in which a state has upheld a home owner's interests in 
property, privacy, and freedom of association by sustaining the 
trespass conviction of an officious, uninvited guest, not because such 
a case would be unreviewable, but simply because any equal protec-
tion claim advanced by the trespasser would be so obviously insub-
stantial that review would be unwarranted. 
The difference in approach, therefore, need not occasion any 
long run surfeit of cases,54 and it most assuredly does not introduce 
any uncertainty into the law which is avoided by the traditional 
approach. Indeed, the ad hoc exceptions to the "no·reviewable state 
action" doctrine are themselves so numerous and unruly that no one 
can confidently predict what the Court may or may not do in a given 
case. 
On the other hand, several distinct advantages are offered by the 
approach endorsed here, which begins by eliminating the category 
of "no-reviewable state action." First, it discards a cumbersome and 
misleading fiction and reiterates an obvious proposition, viz., the 
fourteenth amendment by its very terms brings the fairness of every 
state policy, manifest in a state law resolving conflicting claims of 
right, within the Court's legitimate discretion to determine whether 
that policy, as applied in a given case, offends constitutional norms of 
due process or equal protection. Second, it avoids the false assump-
tion that state action sufficient to bring a case within the range of 
constitutional review is also sufficient to establish a violation of con-
stitutional norms of due process or equal protection. Third, it 
avoids the equally false assumption that extraordinary state action, 
i.e., collateral connections, is a prerequisite of review under the four-
teenth amendment, and it encourages the Court to consider collateral 
state action only as it affects the character of the interests actually 
involved in a given dispute. 
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